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Introduction
Since the …rst oil crisis of 1973, the US stock exchange has been marked by two major setback episodes of its aggregate dividend index : the dot-com bust and the Lehman-Brothers collapse (see Figure 1 ). These two disaster episodes mark two subperiods, as depicted by Figure 1: the pre-and post-Lehman-Brothers regimes. In the post-Lehman-Brothers period (subperiod 2), by the end of July 2017, the stock market has grown above and beyond its pre-Lehman-Brothers peak by more than 36% in real terms (58% in nominal terms). On the other hand, we see that the real 6-month bond rate has decreased signi…cantly from a mean bond rate of 0.33% in subperiod 1 to -1.29% in subperiod 2. This high increase in stock prices together with persistently negative bond rates after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, looks like a stock-bond dissonance according to standard asset pricing theory. We further observe that the price-dividend ratio has signi…cantly fallen from subperiod 1 to subperiod 2 from 60.24 to 49.26 as depicted in Table 1 . These two empirical observations are essential for explaining the current stock-bond dissonance. Later in the subsection 5.1 these are our four targets which we want to match. b Di¤erence-of-means t-test for di¤erence from previous subperiod's statistic is 9.53 (p-value is 0).
c Wilcoxon signed-ranks test for di¤erence from previous subperiod's median is 12.13 (p-value is 0).
According to standard asset-pricing theory, it is reasonable to think that investors have rebalanced their portfolios, demanding more stocks instead of bonds. If this was true, then the bond price would have fallen, leading to an increase in the bond rate. However, in the post-Lehman-Brothers period, the bond rate has signi…cantly decreased and persistently stayed in a negative regime. This stock-bond dissonance, (a) the persistent drop in bond rates, and (b) the persistent growth of stock prices, is a paradox.
To explain this stock-bond dissonance we use the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model with rare disasters as in Barro (2006) . We focus on two key observations in the data, which are the signi…cant drop in the bond rate and the signi…cant drop in the price-dividend ratio, which we try to match with the model. We show that a change in investors'expectations about the frequency of rare disasters can explain the observed dissonance. More precisely, after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, the investors have the perception of higher market fragility, i.e. higher disaster risk hitting the real economy, such as a sudden drop in dividends. In our calibration exercise we show that without changing the investors'preference parameters, nor market fundamentals, in both subperiods, the model can match the data only by allowing for an increase in investors'perceived frequency of a rare disaster.
Our model builds upon investors'increasing fear for more frequent market disruptions.
As in Barro (2006) a rare disaster can be any low-probability event that triggers a sharp drop in per capita GDP or consumption. An economic disaster can be triggered by economic events that a¤ect the business sector and speci…cally the aggregate dividend index (Great Depression in 1929 , the 2008 , or by natural diasters, wartime destruction (World War I, World War II, nuclear con ‡icts). As in asset-pricing literature with rare disaster risks, e.g., Barro (2006 ), Gabaix (2012 , Gourio (2012) , and Wachter (2013), we assume that rare disasters are exogenous events. Although bonds are not a perfect hedge against disaster risks, investors substitute bonds for stocks in case of higher market fragility. According to our model, an explanation to the paradox is based on investor perceptios about disaster risk: investors think that disasters occur once every 30 years on average compared to once every 60 years on average before the Lehman-Brothers collapse. Our argument is based on the fact that there is no decrease in the dividend growth rate nor an increase in its dividend volatility (outside crashes). So, without changing perceptions about disaster risk (market fragility), the drop in the price-dividend ratio or the drop in the bond rate.
Our sensitivity analysis supports our market-fragility explanation. Being aware that disaster risk is considered to be "dark matter", in our sensitivity analysis, we use a range of initial disaster probabilities from 1.7% to 2.5% in subperiod 1 and doubling the frequency for subperiod 2. Our model still performs relatively well which recon…rms our working hypothesis of an increase in market fragility.
We also calibrate our model allowing for the possibility of a partial default in government bonds, making them not completely risk-free. We show that the sovereign-default risk is less important quantitatively to explain the observed stock-bond dissonance. Indeed sovereigndefault risk raises the government bond rate as markets require a default premium. Hence, it is market fragility alone that can explain the persistently negative government bond rates.
Our market-fragility explanation is in line with a number of studies focusing on rare disaster risks in asset pricing. First, an in ‡uential body of literature suggests that disaster risk is variable. More speci…cally we refer to Gabaix (2012) , Gourio (2012), and Wachter (2013) , who demonstrate that this variability can explain many asset-pricing puzzles. In addition, Marfe and Penasse (2017) …nd empirical evidence for disaster-risk variablity. Another body of literature assumes imperfect information about rare disaster risk and argues that parameter learning implies more pessimistic disaster-risk beliefs after a rare disaster (Collin-Dufresne et al., 2016 , Koulovatianos and Wieland, 2017 , and Kozlowski et al., 2017 .
All these studies agree that after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, beliefs about rare disaster risk should be more pessimistic, backing up the working hypothesis examined in this paper.
Yet, for the sake of simplicity, here we employ only rational expectations and an unexpected post-disaster structural break. 
More empirical details on the paradox
To describe the aggregate dividend process described in Figure 1 , we assume that, as in Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 , dividends, D t , follow the process, 
introduced low-probability, rare disasters to the dividend process, i.e., with probability 2 (0; 1) dividends are hit by a negative rare disaster shock of size t+1 . Variable t+1 2 (0; 1)
is a random variable with given time-invariant distribution and compact support, Z (0; 1).
An interesting feature of the post-Lehman-Brothers stock prices is that the P-D ratio has fallen signi…cantly (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ). For explaining the persistent drop in the P-D ratio, it would be reasonable to focus on changes in fundamentals. The three parameters involved in equations (1) and (2) are , , and . We …rst examine whether the transition from subperiod 1 to subperiod 2 has been marked by any changes in the trend, , and in the component of volatility that is not related to disasters, namely parameter . Interestingly, neither , nor have changed across subperiods 1 and 2.
2.1 What remained constant across subperiods 1 and 2: the dividend trend and the non-crash dividend volatility
In order to see that neither , nor changed across subperiods 1 and 2, we …rst need to obtain an estimate for , the non-disaster-shock dividend volatility, by excluding crashepisode periods. The criterion for determining non-crash periods is explained by Figure   2 . Regarding measures of the average dividend growth rate, in Table 2 Jarque-Bera test statistics are reported, testing normality of distributions. While the dividend growth rate does not fail a normality test in subperiod 1, normality is rejected in subperiod 2. For this reason, a test of equality of means across subperiods 1 and 2 is not appropriate. Instead, in Table 3 we report a number of equality tests for the medians of the dividend growth rate across subperiods 1 and 2.
Table 3 -Tests of equality of medians of dividend growth across subperiods 1 and 2.
Variable "GR_D_1" is the dividend growth rate in subperiod 1 and Variable "GR_D_2"
is the dividend growth rate in subperiod 2. This is a standardized Eviews output.
Since according to all median tests reported in Table 3 the null hypothesis of equality between the two medians cannot be rejected, in our calibration of the model below, we use the total-sample median spanning the two subperiods, from July 2000 until July 2017 (205 months in total) which is equal to 6.32% (see also the last line in Table 3 ).
Regarding the measure of non-disaster dividend volatility (volatility of dividend growth excluding crash periods), for subperiod 1 we include the months from 2000/7 until 2007/7
and for subperiod 2 we include the months from 2009/6 until 2017/7. for which crash periods are excluded, and variable "GRD2_NO" is the dividend growth rate in subperiod 2, for which crash periods are excluded as well. This is a standard Eviews output.
Based on Table 4 , the standard deviations for these no-disaster subperiods are 12.22% and 11.57%, but all tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that these two standard deviations are equal. So, throughout the rest of the paper, in the calibration below, we use the totalsample standard deviation, spanning the two subperiods, from July 2000 until July 2017 (183 months in total, after excluding the period from August 2007 until May 2009), which is equal to 11.91% (see also the penultimate line in Table 4 ).
What changed across subperiods 1 and 2: perceptions about disaster risk
While neither , nor changed across subperiods 1 and 2, parameter , seems to have changed. Our working hypothesis is that there has been a pessimistic shift in rare-disaster beliefs about parameter after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, i.e. mhas increased. This working hypothesis is corroborated by an increase in the "SKEW"index, depicted by Figure   3 . The SKEW index partially reveals the investors'beliefs on market fragility. despite that it is not a perfect proxy for the rare disaster risk hitting the dividend index. Figure 3 plots the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Skew index, commonly known as "SKEW".
According to Chicago Board Options Exchange CBOE (2010), the SKEW is an indicator based on options, measuring the perceived tail risk of the distribution of Standard and Poor's (S&P) 500 log returns at a 30-day horizon. The SKEW measures tail risk, and speci…cally the risk related to an increase in the probability of extreme negative outlier returns, two or more standard deviations below the mean. Details on the formal de…nition of SKEW is provided by Chicago Board Options Exchange CBOE (2010, p. 5).
The main point made by Figure 3 is that the mean level of the SKEW index has increased in subperiod 2. Interestingly, the SKEW index is well approximated by a normal distribution in both subperiods (the Jarque-Bera statistic is 3.71, implying a p-value of 0.16 in subperiod 1, while for subperiod 2 the Jarque-Bera statistic is 2.51, implying a p-value of 0.29). Standard errors in parentheses.
a Di¤erence-of-means t-test for di¤erence from previous subperiod's statistic is -6.37 (p-value is 0). Table 5 presents a formal statistical test revealing that the mean SKEW has increased signi…cantly in subperiod 2. This evidence supports our working hypothesis that, after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, beliefs about rare disasters have become more pessimistic. The risk interpretation of the changes reported by Figure 3 and Table 5 is given by Chicago Board
Options Exchange CBOE (2010, p. 8). Speci…cally, the estimated risk-adjusted probability that the S&P 500 may experience a sudden drop of two standard deviations in the next 30 days has increased from 6.89% in subperiod 1 to 8.27% in subperiod 2 on average. Similarly, the estimated risk-adjusted probability of a sudden drop of three standard deviations has increased from 1.16% in subperiod 1 to 1.46% in subperiod 2 on average. Although these estimates are not a perfect proxy of the risk of a rare disaster hitting the dividend index, they reveal that beliefs about tail risks and market fragility have been elevated after the Lehman-Brothers collapse. In the rest of the paper we use an asset-pricing model in order to investigate whether a change in alone across subpriods 1 and 2 is capable of replicating key asset-pricing features summarized by Table 1 , and we obtain a model-based sense of the increase in parameter .
Model
In this section we present our model with disaster risk. We follow the classic Lucas-tree setup (Lucas, 1978) . There is a risky asset, the stock composite index (the market portfolio), and a one-year zero-coupon bond. Our stylized asset-pricing model that uses i.i.d. disaster shocks hitting the dividend process, and summarized by equations (1) and (2), implies a ‡at term structure on bond rates in equilibrium, so there is no need to introduce bonds with di¤erent maturity. The one-year zero-coupon bond is not entirely risk-free. In the case of a rare disaster hitting the dividend process, the probability of a partial default on government bonds exists. So we do not only have market fragility in our model but also a sovereign-default risk.
The budget constraint of an investor is,
Inve stm e nt in S to ck s
Inve stm e nt in B o n d s
in which S t 1 and B t 1 is the number of stocks and bonds held by the investor in the beginning of period t, while P t and Q t are the stock and bond prices in period t. The term 
with 2 [0; 1). If both a dividend-disaster and a default occur ( t = B t = 1), then the zero-coupon bond pays 1 units of the consumable good, i.e., it defaults by the fraction
, and t+1 are independent among each other and also independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over time.
Preferences are recursive, of the form of Epstein-Zin-Weil (EZW), with utility in period t, denoted by J t , given by the recursion,
in which > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), > 0 is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and 2 (0; 1) is the utility discount factor that is inversely related to the rate of time preference, = (1 ) = .
Asset prices
Equation (1) implies that dividend growth is random following i.i.d. shocks over time. In
Appendices A through C we prove that these i.i.d. shocks imply a constant P-D ratio over time, denoted by x,
(1 ) 1 1 1 , t = 0; 1; :::, (1 )
1 , t = 0; 1; :::.
Empirical implications and tests of the model
The ‡at P-D ratio implied by equation (6) is not a bad approximation of the P-D ratio dynamics in both subperiods 1 and 2. As Figure 1 indicates, after the P-D ratio overreactions to the disaster episodes calmed down, P-D ratios remained almost constant throughout subperiods 1 and 2, but at di¤erent levels. For empirical evidence on the validity of (6), notice that another way of writing (6) is,
In Table 6 we report estimates of 1 in the cointegrating equation,
whenever cointegration is applicable, based on Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root tests. Table 6 provides evidence that, in subperiods 1 and 2, ln (P t ) and ln (D t ) are both integrated of order 1, and that the estimates of 1 do not di¤er much from 1. 2 In subperiod 1, coe¢ cient 1 is not signi…cantly di¤erent from 1. Although in subperiod 2 coe¢ cient 1 di¤ers from 1, the value of 0:88 supports that equation (8) is not a bad big-picture approximation of …nancial markets in the US after the Lehman-Brothers collapse. This evidence validates using the Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 ) model for asset-pricing purposes during subperiods 1 and 2, despite that these subperiods have relatively short length of about 8 years each.
Calibration

Benchmark calibration and key targets
We summarize our calibrating parameter values in Table 7 , focusing on the benchmark case of no sovereign fragility ( = = 0). Parameter is a newly introduced parameter. It is based on the …nding by Barro and Jin (2011) that, after transforming disaster sizes using the formula z = 1= (1 ), empirically, variable z is Pareto distributed with density f (z) = z 0 =z +1 , in which z 0 is the minimum value of z. Our chosen value for 0 (obeying z 0 = 1= (1 0 ), the minimum cuto¤ disaster size) is 12.5%. We independently estimate , and choose calibrating values of from the 95% con…dence interval of its estimated value. 3 For estimating , we use the database by Barro and Jin (2011) that refers to GDP disasters, which is downloadable from, https://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/size-distribution-macroeconomic-disasters-data Barro and Jin (2011) present a sensitivity analysis of all their results considering that the lower bound for the disasters, 0 , ranges from 9.5% to 14.5%, while Barro (2006 Barro ( , 2009 3 We use this estimated Pareto distribution in order to compute all expressions involving the expectation E ( ). Barro and Jin (2011) demostrate that the goodness of …t to disaster-size data increases if one uses two Pareto distributions, each being e¤ective for a di¤erent interval of the support of z. Yet, a single Pareto distribution also gives a good approximation, so we use this for simplicity.
also work with 0 = 15%. We pick a value somewhere in the middle of this range, setting 0 = 12:5%, which leaves 110 disasters out of 157 in the Barro and Jin (2011) sample. Using the maximum-likelihood estimation of the "shape" parameter in the Pareto distribution, we obtain an estimate for equal to 5:986 (standard error 0.57), and a 95% con…dence interval implying that^ 2 [4:87; 7:11].
4 Figure 4 -Goodness of …t of transformed disaster-size data above the 12.5% threshold.
Source: Barro and Jin (2011) .
In our calibration exercise we compute all expectations involving , using E ( ) based on a Pareto distribution for the transformed variable z = 1= (1 ) The key element of our calibration exercise is that, in subperiod 2, after the LehmanBrothers collapse, the disaster-risk parameter, , has more than doubled, re ‡ecting that disasters occur in slightly less than 30 years (1=3:5% ' 29) on average. 5 In Table 8 we can see that this simple modi…cation in perceived market fragility is capable of replicating the persistent changes in the bond rate and the P-D ratio that occurred after the Lehman-Brothers collapse.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis: varying the disaster probability in the …rst subperiod
In this subsection we provide a sensitivity analysis using a di¤erent benchmark for 1 : instead of …xing 1 to 1:7%. We vary its values in a range from 1:5% to 2:5%, doubling 2 in each calibration exercise. The key message here is that none of the matching preference parameters , , and , change drastically.
Table 9 -Sensitivity analysis examining the impact of changing 1 .
We perform a sensitivity analysis focusing on changing the disaster probability parameter . Compared to the benchmark value of 1 at 1:7%, we expand the parameter space ranging from 1 = 1:5% to 1 = 2:5%. Keeping all parameters inferred from data constant, namely doubling 2 at the same time.
Figure 5 -Sensitivity analysis examining the impact of changing 1 (and setting 2 = 2 1 ) on preference parameters, , , and that provide the best …t to the four data targets, keeping , , and constant.
Fitting the four targets of Table 8 through a minimum-distance approach, Figure 5 and Table 9 report how the three preference parameters, , , and , change as we vary the anchor value of 1 each time. In Table 9 , we provide the re-calibrated parameters and the corresponding matched values. Under this sensitivity analysis, our model still performs rel-atively well. The model simulated values do not vary much compared to the benchmark results, and the results are quite close to the actual data targets. Regarding the preference parameters , , and , Figure 5 plots the corresponding variations, and none of the matching preference parameters change drastically. Importantly, according to Chen, Dou, and Kogan (2017, Figure 1 , p. 23), we are con…dent that our calibration parameters are in the "acceptable calibration"area for models like ours.
Sensitivity analysis: sovereign-default risk
We also introduce sovereign-default risk, setting = E ( ) = 23:28%, and = 40%, as in Barro (2006) . As it is obvious from formulas (6) and (7), sovereign-default risk leaves P-D ratios unaltered, but raises r B , as markets require a default premium. Using our calibrating values from Table 3 , the resulting interest rates are r B 1 = 0:75% and r B 2 = 0:50%. In light of our sensitivity analysis, it seems that even if sovereign-default risk is present, it is, instead market fragility that is most likely to explain recent asset-price trends. Especially if we think that higher sovereign-default risk emerged after the Lehman-Brothers collapse, this risk element would push bond rate upward instead of downward.Conclusion
Conclusion: market fragility can resolve the paradox
The …rst part of the stock-bond-dissonance paradox refers to why bond rates have been so persistently low. Since the Lehman-Brothers collapse, the rise in stock prices creates the plausible impression that markets have increased their demand for stocks, lowering the demand for bonds. However, if fewer bonds had been demanded in the post-Lehman-Brothers era, then bond rates should have increased. Our approach to this part of the paradox has been to focus on explaining the simultaneous drop in the P-D ratio through increased market fragility, captured by the size of parameter in our model. Our theory says that there is no paradox: the drop in the P-D ratio implies that this substitution between stocks and bonds did not necessarily happen; instead markets must have increased the demand for bonds, while decreasing the demand for stocks in a subtle manner.
The other part of the paradox, referring to why stock prices have grown so much and so fast, can be explained by the fact that no disasters have occurred after 2008. To an extent, the dividend trend, captured by parameter in the model, re ‡ects the incremental productivity growth of …rms in the stock exchange. Disasters a¤ect the perceived e¤ective growth of dividends, so di¤erent perceptions of disaster risk before and after the …nancial crisis a¤ect only the perceived but not the actual growth of dividends and prices. Therefore, the fast rise of stock prices can be explained by the coincidence, that no disasters have occurred after
2008.
For explaining the persistently negative bond returns, we do not rule out that the Fed policy contributed to the high demand for bonds. Yet, according to our approach, it is market fragility (perhaps bank fragility that followed the 2008 …nancial crisis, consistent with a rise in in our model), that led the Fed to its aggressive quantitative easing policy.
Our suggested market fragility explanation for resolving the paradox, points at a …rst message: it is crucial to avoid misinterpreting seemingly good market trends as market robustness at times of underlying market fragility. Market fragility always implies weaker investment in the real economy. This weakness alters the e¤ects of planned …scal and monetary policies. Our arguments in this study may serve as a starting point for new research on better identifying underlying market fragility and its sources.
1. Appendix A -Proof of equations (6) and (7) in the paper
Using the transformation,
the budget constraint (3) becomes,
in which R P t is the gross portfolio return de…ned as,
being the gross returns of stocks and bonds, and with S t = P t S t = (P t S t + Q t B t ) and B t = Q t B t = (P t S t + Q t B t ) being the portfolio weights.
Using (A.2) the Bellman equation is, (A.5) subject to (A.3) and subject to the stochastic structure given by (1) and (2). Under a general stochastic structure, the value function, V t ( ), is of the form, 6 V (W t ) = t W t , t = 0; 1; ::: .
(A.6) A useful implication of (A.6) is, In addition, (A.6) implies the key asset pricing equation of this model, which is,
In the standard textbook Lucas (1978) asset-pricing model the key simplifying assumption is that all investors are identical, all having the same amount of S 1 stocks in period 0, and all having B t 1 = 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, i.e., bonds in zero net supply in all periods. Identical investors do not trade stocks in equilibrium. Combining these simplifying assumptions of no trade in equilibrium with the budget constraint, and also with equations (3) and (A.1), we obtain, In Appendix C we prove that, as a consequence of our assumption that variables " t+1 , t+1 , and t+1 are i.i.d. over time, the P-D ratio is also constant over time, i.e.,
x t = x , t = 0; 1; ::: . (A.13) Substituting (A.13) into (A.12), proves the formula given by (6).
For proving equation (7) we substitute (A.4), (A.10), (A.11), and (A.13) into (A.8), for i = B, to obtain,
Equation (A.14) implies a constant value for Q t over time, Q t = Q for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g.
The bond price, Q, is set a-priori to the realization of disasters and defaults. This is the reason why Q is constant over time. Yet, because of the sovereign default risk, the ex-post bond return is variable over time. Speci…cally, with probability , the ex-post (postdefault) maturity price of the bond is 1 , making the ex-post bond return equal to In equation (7) we refer to the expected return implied by equation (A.15), which is given by E r B = (1 ) =Q 1.
Appendix B -Proof of equation (A.7)
Take equation (A.6) as an initial guess for the functional form of the value function, considering that t is an unknown stochastic process. Substituting (A.6) into equation (A.5) we obtain, in which,
. Taking …rst-order conditions on equation (A.5) with respect to C t gives,
Equation (A.17) implies, 3. Appendix C -Proof that the price-dividend ratio is constant To see that x t+1 = x t = x for t = 0; 1; :::, …x some x t = x t > 0, assuming that x t is a solution to the asset-pricing model. Consider conditional expectations for (A.23), namely,
(A.24) Equation (A.24) implies a unique solution for E t (x t+1 ). Let that unique solution be x t+1 = E t (x t+1 ). Using x t+1 , consider equation (A.24) one period ahead to obtain x t+2 E t+1 (x t+2 ).
Notice that, due to additive separability, and since the choice of t 2 f0; 1; :::g was arbitrary, If g t+1 6 = 1, since x t > 0, we can easily verify that equation (A.26) implies unstable dynamics for x t . If g t+1 > 1 for some t, then (A.26) implies g t+s > 1 for all s 2 f0; 1; :::g, and x t ! 1.
If g t+1 < 1 for some t, then eventually gt < 0 for somet > t, leading to xt < 0. For 6 = 1 (which is of interest for matching the data), both of these possibilities lead to a nonwell-de…ned value function. To see this, use equations (A.7), (A.11), (A.9), and (A.6) to obtain, V t (W t ) = t W t = (1 ) 1 (1 + x t ) 1 S 1 D t . (A.27) For x t ! 1, either V t (W t ) ! 1 (if > 1), or V t (W t ) ! 0, (if < 1), even if 0 < D t < 1.
None of these possibilities implies a well-de…ned value function or a maximum value, given that the EZW utility function represents a cardinal certainty-equivalent time aggregator measured in consumption units (in addition, the solution g t = 1 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, gives V t (W t ) > 0 bounded away from 0 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g). Since from equation (A.9) C t =W t = 1= (1 + x t ), having xt < 0 for somet > t, implies Ct > Wt, and equation (A.2) then gives
> 0, i.e. Vt (Wt) < 0, which is unacceptable, given the consumption-unit cardinality of EZW preferences. But even if R P t+1
< 0, having negative stock prices in an exchange economy of identical agents is impossible in equilibrium. So, the only acceptable equilibrium solution for (A.26) is g t = 1 for all t 2 f0; 1; :::g, which leads to equation (A.13), proving the result.
